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Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee: My name is Jay Thomas. I
hold the position of Professor of Law at Georgetown University, where I teach and write in the field
of intellectual property law. I am grateful to have this opportunity to share my views regarding
potential reforms to the law of patent damages. I testify today on my behalf, as a concerned observer
of the patent system.
A number of recent trends have increased demand for greater precision in patent law’s
damages principles. Chief among them are increased industrial focus on the patent system, expanded
efforts to derive value from patents, and the Supreme Court opinion in eBay v. mercExchange.1 In
view of eBay, courts can no longer necessarily rely on the backdrop of an injunction, coupled with
private negotiation, to compensate successful plaintiff-patentees. They must generate prospective
damages awards themselves.
Unfortunately, the perception is widely shared that the rules pertaining to damages are less
certain than many other patent doctrines. Some observers have faulted jury reliance upon expert
testimony that may lack credibility and sufficiency. Others have characterized the substantive law
of patent damages as undisciplined and indefinite. The lack of a coherent standard for assessing
reasonable royalties, the logical difficulties that attend such fundamental methodologies as the
hypothetical negotiation, the circularity of current market-based analyses, and a leaning towards
overcompensation are among the areas of concern. The result has arguably been insufficiently
predictable awards that serve the purposes of the patent system poorly.2
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To address these concerns, two types of patent damages reforms have been proposed before
the 111th Congress. One would effectively reinforce the existing ability of accused infringers to
challenge expert testimony as failing to meet prevailing standards of relevancy and reliability. The
other would clarify current standards for patent damages law. In my opinion, both sorts of reforms
would potentially play significant roles in bring greater predictably to patent damages law, and both
deserve further consideration.
I. Proposed Evidentiary Reforms
Many observers believe that the evidence regarding damages that is placed before juries in
patent trials should be subject to closer scrutiny. H.R. 1260 would introduce language into the Patent
Act essentially reminding judges that “[t]he admissibility of [expert] testimony shall be governed
by the rules of evidence governing expert testimony.3 S. 515 places even greater emphasis upon the
sufficiency of evidence concerning damages, requiring judges to scrutinize the “methodologies and
factors” asserted by the patent proprietor prior to allowing the court or jury to consider them.4
These proposed reforms, while potentially valuable, appear largely to focus attention upon
existing evidentiary standards. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 currently requires expert testimony
to be based upon sufficient facts or data and the product of reliable principles and methods; further,
these principles and methods must be applied reliably to the facts of the case. Accused infringers
may file Daubert motions to exclude expert testimony that fails to meet standards of relevancy and
reliability.5 Patent trial practice further allows for extensive discovery into the litigants’ theories of
damages, with discovery, exchanges of expert reports, and depositions of relevant witnesses and
experts. Judge Rader’s recent decision in Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co. further
demonstrates that post-verdict motions may also be used to address evidentiary shortcomings with
respect to damages.6
Despite these standards and procedures, many innovative firms have continued to voice
concerns about the state of patent damages law. As a result, amendments to the Patent Act that
merely reinforce longstanding evidentiary standards may do little to promote efficiency and
rationality in damages awards. Absent reforms of the substantive law that applies to the factual
circumstances of individual cases, evidentiary reforms may ultimately work scant improvement to
the current environment of patent damages.
In addition, inherent limitations upon the judiciary appear to render the legislature the more
appropriate venue for achieving meaningful reforms to damages law. The prominent use of juries
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in patent trials,7 the deferential standard of review applied to their damages awards,8 and the limited
time to state one’s case on appeal do not place the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or other
judicial fora in an enviable position to advance the law of damages in comparison with other patent
doctrines. It should be further appreciated that the Federal Circuit is bound by the Supreme Court
ruling in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,9 a fragmented and often
criticized decision regarding the basic damages principles of patent law. Awaiting judicial
developments may not prove to be a rewarding tactic for resolving concerns about damages awards
in patent infringement cases.
II. Proposed Substantive Reforms
Prevailing legal standards with respect to reasonable royalty determinations have been
roundly criticized for their indeterminancy and logical shortcomings. Under current law, courts
indulge in the legal fiction of a hypothetical licensing negotiation.10 The reasonable royalty is set
to the rate a willing patent owner and willing licensee would have decided upon had they negotiated
the license on the date the infringement began.11 The well-known district court decision in
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.12 identified numerous factors to be
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318 F.Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y.1970), modified and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). These
factors include:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or
tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or
non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product
may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under
special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they
are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are

3

considered in reaching a damages determination.
Experience suggests that the Georgia-Pacific factors are difficult to apply consistently.
Although Georgia-Pacific provides a long list of ingredients, it offers no recipe–that is to say, no
principles for deciding whether one of the seemingly randomly ordered elements should be weighed
more heavily than another in a given determination. The laundry list of Georgia Pacific factors,
many of which include several sub-components, cannot plausibly be considered to provide a
“standard” for setting reasonable royalty rates at all. The result has been a potpourri of factors that
experts may apply with virtually unlimited discretion.
The hypothetical negotiation framework also possesses shortcomings. In theory it focuses
attention upon the desired royalty award: “an amount which a person, desiring to manufacture and
sell a patented article, as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able

inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the
licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his
non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial
success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any,
that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of
it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence
probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or
analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been
reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a
prudent licensee-- who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to
manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention-- would have
been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which
amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a
license.
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to make and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit.”13 Yet judicial decisions
at times seems to have lost sight of the notion that a bargained-for exchange should offer benefits
to both negotiating parties. The decision in Go-Light v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.14 provides one
example of this troubling tendency.
In Go-Light, Wal-Mart was found to infringe a patent claiming a wireless, remote-controlled,
portable search light. The district court awarded the patentee damages of $31.80 per infringing unit.
Although this figure was in theory based upon the reasonable royalty methodology, the district court
in fact arrived at this number by awarding 50% of the patentee’s incremental profits. On appeal,
Wal-Mart pointed to evidence that it typically paid 2-5% of the product’s wholesale cost as an
intellectual property royalty, and that the court’s damages award left it selling the patented product
at a significant loss. The court of appeals quickly dismissed these assertions, however,
characterizing Wal-Mart’s assertions as “nothing more than whit it might have preferred to pay . .
. .”15 Affirming the damages award, the Federal Circuit cited previous holdings for the proposition
that “[t]here is no rule that a royalty be no higher than the infringer’s net profit margin.”16
The hypothetical negotiation methodology further assumes that the negotiators come to the
bargaining table with the assumption that the patent is not invalid and has been infringed.17
Although a judgment upholding a patent is necessarily a predicate of assessing patent damages,
negotiations held at the time infringement has commenced would assuredly not proceed employing
this assumption. Such bargaining would instead recognize that both patent validity and infringement
may be contested by the accused infringer.18
To reasonable negotiators, the possibility of a patent been held invalid, or construed in a
manner unfavorable to its proprietor, would undoubtedly result in some discount in favor of the
13
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accused infringer.19 The amount of this discount may be considerable. Although estimates of the
percentage of litigated patents vary, empirical studies have suggested that approximately one-third
of litigated patents–and possible an even higher percentage–are ruled to be invalid.20 Notably, in
some market segments the percentage of invalidated patents appears to be much higher. In HatchWaxman cases addressing pharmaceutical patents, for example, generic firms apparently prevail over
patent holders 70% of the time.21 The premise that the patent is nonetheless indisputably not invalid
and infringed necessarily causes the hypothetical negotiation methodology to fail to account for an
essential reality of licensing negotiations that occur outside the courtroom.
For these and other reasons, damages rulings are widely viewed as unpredictable and difficult
to review, but also as tending towards overcompensation to the patent proprietor. The systematic
overcompensation of patent owners may interfere with the very purposes the patent system is
intended to serve. Excessive damages awards effectively allow inventors to obtain proprietary
interests in products they have not invented, promote patent speculation and litigation, and place
unreasonable royalty burdens upon producers of high technology products. Such consequences may
ultimately slow the process of technological innovation and dissemination that the patent system is
intended to foster.22
With congressional attention focused upon the patent system, bringing some order to the law
of damages seems a worthwhile goal. Toward this end, H.R. 1260 proposes in part a rule that
reasonable royalties should relate “only to the portion of the economic value of the infringing
product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention’s specific contribution over the
prior art.” There seems to be widespread acceptance of this basic position that damages should be
based upon the incremental value of the invention. As explained by Chief Judge Michel:
19

Edward F. Sherry & David J. Teece, Some Economic Aspects of Intellectual Property Damages,
573 PLI/Pat 399, 418 (1999) (“Our point here is that a ‘reasonable royalty’ for the purposes of assessing
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actual negotiated royalty for the same patent, because the actual negotiated royalty reflects what might be
termed an ‘uncertainty discount’ because of uncertainty about validity and infringement issues.”).
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The precise invalidity percentage varies depending upon the time period considering in the
study. See, e.g., Kimberly Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
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Where the value added can be established, it should be used. Look to the market
value of the product with the next best, non-infringing substitute for the component
causing infringement.23
A promising first step towards patent damages reform would be to replace the hypothetical
negotiation of Georgia Pacific with a sensible rule that tracks real-world decision making. Faced
with the choice of using a proprietary technology, a manufacturer decides what advantage would
accrue through the use of that technology in comparison with the next-best alternative–including
using public domain technology, designing distinct technology, or not incorporating that
functionality into the adjudicated infringement at all. The difference in net values between the
patented technology and next-best alternative should comprise the amount that the patent owner and
infringer would share via the payment of a reasonable royalty.
III. Conclusion
A fundamental premise of the patent system is that the market most effectively assesses the
worth of inventions.24 As Judge Giles S. Rich explained:
[I]t is one of the legal beauties of the system that what is given by the people through
their government–the patent right–is valued automatically by what is given by the
patentee. His patent has value directly related to the value of his invention, as
determined in the marketplace.25
Far from being “automatic,” however, patent valuation has proven a complex task both for the courts
and for private actors who must reach decisions based upon ambiguous doctrines. Both evidentiary
and substantive reforms would potentially play valuable roles in improving damages doctrines,
ultimately bringing greater rationality and predictability to the patent system.
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